К ВОПРОСУ О МОТИВАХ ПРИНЯТИЯ РУКОВОДСТВОМ КНР РЕШЕНИЯ О СОЗДАНИИ СОБСТВЕННОГО ЯДЕРНОГО ОРУЖИЯ
Abstract
tracing it back to the time when it was launched in 1955. The
author questions the common sense assumption that Chinas
nuclear ambitions were primarily aimed at providing military
security as the launch of the programme seemingly jeopardized
the newly formed communist state. The article presents
evidence that the Chinese military and political elite did not
want China to be seen as a third-rate country and was motivated
by the desire to form a national identity and make up for
the grievances of the past.
About the Author
Георгий КачанRussian Federation
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